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The relationship between inter-state reparations and individual entitlements to reparation: 
some reflections  
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 In an inter-state reparations claim, the injured State’s approach to reparations may differ from the 
vision of injured individuals and communities. An injured state may deem precise valuation of 
losses to be too time-consuming or simply impossible, due to a lack of evidence. It might take 
account the offending state’s inability to pay, or adopt a conciliatory approach to preserve or 
restore friendly relations or to reflect pre-existing debts or relationships between the two states.  
 
For similar reasons, an injured state might waive the breach or fail to pursue a claim for reparations 
or unduly delay its consideration of the matter.1 Or, it may refrain from appealing a ruling on 
reparations, even though the quantum and quality of the award do not reflect the injuries suffered. 
Furthermore, an injured state may not always apply the award towards addressing the harms caused 
to its nationals.   
 
It has been near impossible for those who feel aggrieved by the settlement process or fall outside 
the bounds of that settlement, to complain before the courts of their nationality2 or the courts of 
the wrongdoing State3 because rights are understood to vest in their State of nationality.4 It has 
likewise been difficult for aggrieved individuals to claim before some human rights courts.5  
 
But, it has been recognised progressively that victims have a ‘right’ to reparation for breaches of 
human rights law and IHL; in IHL, invariably what is recognised is States’ obligation to afford 
reparation and victims’ right to receive it.6  
 
For at least part of a state’s claim under the principle of injury to aliens, it is acting as a caretaker 
or enabler of its nationals’ rights.7 The ICJ alludes to this in its Advisory Opinion on Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall;8 nevertheless it has done little to ensure that the 
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ultimate beneficiaries actually benefit, a problem raised by Judge Cançado Trindade in the context 
of the stalled reparations process in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. 
Uganda).9  
 
Arguably the injured state is duty-bound to optimise its nationals’ rights when they are the intended 
beneficiaries. But even with the best intentions, it can be hard to do so in practice when there are 
many victims and multiple points of view of what might be optimal.  
A state requires latitude to conduct its international affairs. Are victims’ rights to reparation 
capable of impinging on that latitude, at all? Several arguments follow. 
First, the failure to fully (or even partially) account for the interests of the intended beneficiaries 
invalidates the waiver or settlement of the claim. This is in part, what Italy argued in Germany v 
Italy; ‘Italy never intended to waive those claims and could not have done so: … they are the object 
of a régime of reparations which cannot be the object of derogation by States.’10 Thus, according 
to Italy, an injured state would not be able to waive reparations for key violations of IHL because 
of the character of those violations as peremptory norms. This aligns with Judge Cançado 
Trindade’s dissent in that case,11 and also with the direction of some of the ILC deliberations, 
which noted in 2000 in respect of restitution, that ‘the draft articles needed to reflect the proposition 
that if a “crime” in the sense of article 19 had been committed, or a norm of jus cogens had been 
violated, restitution could not be waived by the injured State in favour of compensation, since the 
vital interests of the international community as a whole were at stake in such cases.’12  
 
Second, a related argument concerning peremptory norms - the victims’ right to reparations is not 
extinguished because a waiver or settlement by the injured state would not preclude another state, 
operating on the basis of the injury committed to the international community as a whole, to pursue 
a claim for reparations in the interest of the injured State or of the ultimate beneficiaries.13 Thus, 
an injured state’s actions on the international plane cannot extinguish its nationals’ rights to 
reparations, which have an independent existence.   
 
Third, injured nationals may legitimately expect their state of nationality to faithfully pursue their 
interests on the international plane. The ILC’s draft articles on diplomatic protection take us part 
way, encouraging states to ‘take into account, wherever feasible, the views of injured persons with 
regard to resort to diplomatic protection and the reparation to be sought,’14 and some caselaw 
recognises similarly a legitimate expectation that states of nationality will ‘consider’ making 
representations, though due deference is given to a state’s ability to take into account foreign policy 
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considerations.15 Arguably there is room for greater consideration of these issues by the courts. 
For instance, where the only recourse to justice is an inter-state claim, should a state that refuses 
to take up a matter on behalf of its nationals or does so half-heartedly because of other (conflicting) 
interests, be required to compensate victims for foreclosing the possibility of an adequate and 
effective international settlement?  
 
Could one imagine a victim pursuing successfully a claim for compensation against its state of 
nationality – before the municipal courts of that state or before an international human rights court? 
To do so is not far removed from compensating a victim whose land or property was expropriated 
by the state (to fulfil other legitimate state objectives). The few cases that have arisen before the 
European Court of Human Rights which concerned claimant’s dissatisfaction with an inter-state 
resolution of their claim were deemed inadmissible for a combination of reasons including the 
claimants’ loss of victim status and the wide margin of appreciation afforded to states.16 
 
But the story does not seem finished; one could imagine other courts that afford less ‘flexibility’ 
to states in how they implement their obligations – such as the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, would find differently. Courts have been unwilling to override procedural bars like 
immunities to open up avenues otherwise foreclosed to victims to pursue claims themselves; 
perhaps more attention should be paid to those states who, by their actions (legitimate or not) 
prevent victims from realising their right to reparation. The pendulum has not stopped swinging.   
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